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Prosessien hallinta on monimutkaistunut viime vuosina merkittävästi. Lisäksi erilaiset häi-
riötilanteet käyvät yhä harvinaisemmiksi. Näistä seikoista johtuen ohjeiden merkitys on li-
sääntynyt. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tehdä selkoa Porvoon öljynjalostamon käytössä
olevaan dokumentointijärjestelmään, prosessinohjaukseen, sekä siihen, miten erilaisiin
koko jalostamoa koskeviin häiriöihin on varauduttu. Lisäksi tarkoituksena oli selvittää häi-
riöohjeiden mahdolliseen kehittämiseen liittyviä perusteita ja tarvetta. Dokumentointijärjes-
telmää ja prosessinohjausjärjestelmiä tutkitaan yleisellä tasolla. Tämän kaltainen tarkas-
telu on välttämätöntä työn loppuosan ymmärtämisessä. Koko jalostamoa koskevia häiriöitä
tarkasteltiin niiltä osin, kun niihin oli ohjeistuksilla varauduttu ja kartoitettiin oliko joillekin
uusille ohjeille tarvetta.
Opinnäytteessä tutkimusotteena on käytetty suunnittelututkimusta (design research).
Suunnittelutukimuksen tavoitteisiin kuuluu innovatiivisuus ja tulevaisuuden tarpeisiin kes-
kittyminen pikaoppaiden osalta. Pikaoppaita on tutkittu Porvoon jalostamolla aiemminkin ja
tarkoituksena tässä tutkimuksessa oli vertailla erilaisia ohjepohjia sekä kerätä niistä par-
haita osia yhteen. Häiriöohjeiden kehittämismallina on käytetty NASA:n tuottamaa suosi-
tusta checklist-tyyppisistä ohjeista, jonka tilaajana on ollut Yhdysvaltain viranomainen
NTSB. NTSB tutkii lento-, tie- ja rautatieliikenteessä sekä putkistokuljetuksissa tapahtuvia
onnettomuuksia ja vaaratilanteita. Mallin avulla voidaan parhaimmillaan määrittää ne asiat,
jotka ovat häiriötilanteisiin suunnitellulle pikaoppaalle ominaisia ja sitä kautta kehittää uusi
pikaopaspohja häiriötilanteita varten.
Työn tavoitteena on tutkia mahdollisia puutteita tai vaikeaselkoisia kohtia ohjeistuksissa Por-
voon jalostamolla. Näiden huomioiden pohjalta on tarkoitus luoda pikaoppaalle malli, jossa
on otettu huomioon tieteelliset sekä käytännön kautta opitut perusteet ohjeiden suunnitte-
lussa. Mallin pohjalta on päämääränä luoda pikaopas, jota on mahdollisimman helppo ja
nopea käyttää, mutta mallin käyttö vaatii operaattorilta perustietämyksen prosessiyksiköstä.
Avainsanat häiriö, ohjeet, öljy, jalostamo, pikaopas, checklist, häiriötilantei-
siin varautuminen
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Nowadays process control is becoming more complex, process disturbances are occurring
very rarely and the importance of procedures is increasing. This research studies the pro-
cess procedure system, process control systems, level of preparedness against emer-
gency/process disturbance situations in Neste Oyj, Porvoo refinery.
The second part of this research is designing emergency procedure template for oil indus-
try which utilizes the lessons from Neste’s Porvoo refinery, two nuclear power plants in
Finland, NASA’s contract report 177549&177605 and several other documents that are in-
vestigating procedures and all the matters related to procedure design.
The documentation system and the process control systems are studied in general level
which is necessary for understanding the rest of the research. Process disturbances con-
cerning the whole refinery are examined only to the extent that are predetermined in the
current procedure system.
The research approach was to design science and the goal was to be innovative and to
look far into future of procedure designs. Quick reference guides have been designed and
studied earlier in the Porvoo refinery as well. The purpose of this thesis was to compare all
these designs together and to find all the best parts in them. The checklist template de-
signed by NASA has been used partly as a design model in this research. NASA has pro-
duced instructions for making the checklists to National Transportation Safety Board from
USA which are used widely in the aviation. At its best, the new model can be used to de-
termine the factors that are typical for emergency quick reference guides. The model is
used to develop a new quick reference guide template, which guides the designers to pro-
duce reliable quick reference guides.
The aim of the thesis was to inspect possible vulnerabilities in the procedures of Porvoo
refinery and to create a template that takes scientific and the lessons from practice into ac-
count. The objective is to create a model that is assisting the process operator to give very
quick and reliable response to a process disturbance. The model requires that the operator
has not less than basic knowledge of the process unit.
Keywords emergency, procedures, oil, refinery, quick reference guide,
checklist, emergency preparedness
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11 Introduction
This thesis studies the aspects of emergency preparedness at oil refineries generally
and uses Neste Oyj Porvoo oil refinery in Finland as an example. Porvoo refinery is a
very complex refinery, and it has most of the process units used at modern day refineries;
hence it is a great example for the research. The chapter of checklist/quick reference
guide development is done with help of Fortum Oyj Loviisa nuclear power plant visit,
TVO Olkiluoto nuclear power plant visit and Mr. Asaf Degani formerly from Intelligent
Systems Division in NASA.
The first chapters of the research are describing the documentation system, process
control systems and alarm systems in Porvoo refinery. The following chapters are de-
scribing the fire fighting in oil refineries generally, and Porvoo refinery’s preparedness
against major disturbances. Final chapters are utilized for developing checklist templates
according combined learns from two oil refineries, aviation and nuclear power plant. All
previously mentioned items are inspected from emergency preparedness point of view.
The author has witnessed some deficiencies in the documentation during his 8 years as
a process operator in two different oil refineries in two European countries. These defi-
ciencies motivated him to seek possible improvements through this research. Most of
the deficiencies are usually found in older process units; they are minor safety wise and
the reason for them is usually lower standards in documentation in the 60’s, 70’s and
80’s. Process units from the 21st century are usually documented in high standard, and
the deficiencies are different. The deficiencies in the 21st century documentation are usu-
ally packed around poor typography, impractical templates as well as excessive infor-
mation to operators.
Although procedures are one of the fundamental pillars of safe industrial process control,
it has been difficult to find researches concerning emergency checklist development for
oil industry. Unit downtime time costs significant amounts of money, is always a safety
hazard and increases equipment malfunctions drastically.
22 Process unit procedure system of Porvoo refinery
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic knowledge of process unit pro-
cedure system design in Porvoo refinery. The chapter does not include any licensor doc-
uments or any other documents that are used in the refinery. By reading this chapter,
the reader has enough information to understand the following chapters which are de-
scribing the procedure systems in Neste’s refineries as well as the chapters that are
describing the procedure development for oil refineries generally.
Neste follows corporation standards of setting up ID-system for creating documents in-
cluding unit specific procedures in Porvoo refinery. The management has chosen to use
several different main IDs which are separating different departments from each other.
For production and logistics the main ID is “OQD-“ followed by three to four digits of
numbers (some exceptions may exist). The ID-system is being used in Porvoo refinery,
Naantali refinery, Singapore refinery, Rotterdam refinery, terminals and research & tech-
nology -department. The document ID has to be requested from the administrator of the
Corporate Management System (CMS). The ID has a position in the Kameleon docu-
ment template. OQD-system works in Sharepoint workspace which does not have li-
cense fees (Hujanen, 2011).
Finnish law does not require certain kind of procedure management system. However,
Neste management system follows several certificates including ISO 9001 and ISO
14001. Additionally, Finnish industrial chemical regulation requires sufficient manage-
ment system which provides sufficient information and work procedures as well as emer-
gency procedures for the employees (Hujanen, 2015).
Neste’s management system is inspected by certifier BV (Bureau Veritas) and TUKES
(the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency) (Hujanen, 2015).
Every process unit has specific unit folder where all the important procedures are placed.
Unit folder structure and minimum amount of information has been approved by TUKES.
Every procedure has unique OQD-number, and they are found from physical folders in
the control room, field operators’ social spaces and production manager of the line’s
offices. The procedures are found from company’s intranet as well. Additionally, there
are temporary procedures for abnormal operation situations which are also found from
3intranet. Plant engineer’s responsibility is to make a note to JAWA (e-log book) that there
are new temporary procedures to be followed.
Every unit folder in Porvoo refinery follows specific structure: process description, normal
operation, start-up procedure, shutdown procedure, emergency procedure, controls and
interlocks, safety and used chemicals, catalyst and handling, device procedures, device
list, blinding descriptions and other procedures. Only exception is production 4 in Porvoo
which has additional information in unit folders (Honkimaa and Ranta, 2011).
Checklists are not officially in the OQD-system, and the checklists are not checked peri-
odically same way as procedures in the OQD-system. However, some lists may exist in
the OQD-system as an attachments that should be updated with the correspond OQD-
file.
3 Process control systems generally in Porvoo refinery
3.1 General
Chapter 3 gives an overall view of process control systems used in Porvoo refinery.
There are also some additional information that describes process control systems in
other Neste’s refineries. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic
knowledge of automation designs in a modern day refinery which will help the reader to
understand the matter on following chapters.
All production lines in Finland as well as in Rotterdam and in Singapore refineries are
using Distributed Control Systems (DCS) for controlling the process. Neste uses several
different control systems: Metso DNA, Emerson deltaV, Valmet Damatic, Altim Alcont,
Ahsltröm Alcont, Metso, Honeywell Experion PKS and Honeywell Alcont (Arimo, 2013).
A list of the process control systems used in the Porvoo refinery is presented in Figure
1.
4Figure 1. Process control systems in Porvoo (Arimo, 2013)
DCS is used to control the process units by the control room operators. Complex refin-
eries, as Neste Porvoo, requires a vast amount of controllers, automatic valves, meas-
urements and cable work. DCS is a preferred way to control the process because the
process control is not bound to happen in one physical location. This means that the
process may be controlled elsewhere if the control room is compromised.
3.2 DCS
In the Porvoo refinery the DCS systems are not duplicated. However, often the process
stations are duplicated. If the measurement is considered to be critical for the process,
the measurement is often duplicated, and the measurements are using different I/O-
cards (Arimo, 2013).
Process computers, service stations and alarm stations are duplicated. If one of the sta-
tions is malfunctioning it may be replaced with a new station without causing any breaks
to stable process control. If one of the I/O-cards of the DCS malfunctions, all the meas-
urements and controls are lost until the card is replaced with a new card (Arimo, 2015).
53.3 SIS
SIS (Safety Instrumented System) is duplicated in Porvoo refinery. SIS works over and
without the DCS, see Figure 2. If some part of the process reaches the set-point value
of the interlock, the SIS will make an action over the DCS. In interlock situation the op-
erator is unable to control the interlocked part of the process before the cause of the
interlock has been removed or the interlock has been bypassed by the instrumentation
department.
Interlock and alarm features are important part of process safety. Purpose of these fea-
tures is to: protect humans, environment and process equipment. Safety automation
should be very reliable. Malfunctions in SIS may cause significant damage to people,
environment and process equipment (Neste Oyj, 2013).
All the equipment that are related to process safety have to fulfill Finnish laws, regula-
tions and standards. The standards are: IEC 61508 (Functional Safety of Electrical/Elec-
tronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems) and IEC 61511 (Functional
safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector). IEC 61508 is a
basic functional safety standard applicable to all kinds of industry and IEC 61511 sets
out practices that ensures the safety of an industrial process through the use of instru-
mentation (such as SIS) (IEC, 2010&2013). See automation hierarchy in Figure 2.
I/O-cards are duplicated in SIS. If one card malfunctions the other shall proceed without
any breaks. The malfunctioned card may be removed and replaced with a new one.
Central processing units are duplicated as well.
There are few different SIS-systems being used in Porvoo refinery. FSC (Honeywell Al-
cont), HIMAx (Metso DNA) and relays (Emmerson DeltaV). See Appendix 1 for complete
listing.
6Figure 2. Automation hierarchy in Porvoo (Arimo, 2013)
Neste Porvoo is slowly trying to get rid of the relay logics of SIS for the reason that relays
have few unreliability factors. In addition, the relay logics have to be tested manually
periodically.
3.4 APC
APC is a model-based multi-variable control system which controls larger process enti-
ties. APC may be used to control average reactor bed temperatures for an example.
Without APC the DCS could have eight valves to control (in cascade with the bed tem-
peratures) and the bed temperatures would not be as stable as with the APC. This could
affect to yield, lifetime of the catalyst and so forth. In addition, the APC can be used to
predict fast changes in a process (furnace outlet temperature for an example) and there-
fore prevents process disturbances (Arimo, 2015).
3.5 PMS
PMS or so called TOP-system is used to gather all the main measurement information
for history trending, but it may be used for alarm screening, to control APC and it has
7many other functions if desired. TOP-system gathers data from all the distributed control
systems. In Neste the TOP-system is mainly used for history trending, advanced process
control (APC), for office PC-users (unit performance screening for an example) and as
an overall process screens, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. TOP-system in Porvoo (Arimo, 2013)
4 Alarm systems
4.1 General
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic knowledge of alarm systems,
especially with integrated alarm systems in the DCS. By reading this chapter the reader
should understand the meaning of alarm systems for processes, the hierarchy of alarms,
to understand human capabilities in high load situations, and techniques to reduce alarm
flooding during process disturbances.
4.2 General guidelines of alarm systems
Process alarm systems should be developed in line with procedures and process control
systems. The aim should be to combine these three fields of knowledge to work smoothly
8along each other. The target for the developers should be that the systems are consistent
and the logic of the systems is the same throughout the refinery (or production lines,
assuming that the turnover of operators over the production lines is very low).
The NPD (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) has revealed unsatisfactory conditions re-
lated to alarm systems on oil production sites on the Norwegian continental shelf. The
author assumes that same kind of challenges may be discovered all around the world in
oil refineries. Alarm system is critical for safe process control; hence the alarm systems
should be developed as much as possible. Alarm system should be designed according
to recognized principles for human-machine interaction, available human factor and be-
havior knowledge since the alarm system is vital for safe operation of oil refinery (NDP,
2011).
As the refineries are growing even more complex the HMI becomes more and more
important. The design of control systems as well as alarm systems has to recognize
human nature and its limitations.
Alarm system should be designed to co-op with the operators, and it should support the
operator to concentrate on correct actions and parts of the process unit. This becomes
clearer on the process disturbances when the process units are unstable and the alarm
system is or should be in major role to support the operator. Risk is that the alarm system
stops to support the operator at one point and the volume of the alarms is too high to co-
op with. Every alarm should require an operator response. A response could be a phys-
ical action to manipulate to process state, to contact field operator or instrument techni-
cian or a simple inspection of the process screen (NDP, 2011).
In development state the alarms that are defined by a licensor must always be checked
and made sure that they comply with the client’s alarm philosophy (Neste Jacobs, 2014).
Alarm system should be usable in all process conditions and ensuring that unacceptable
demands are not placed on operators by exceeding their cognitive capabilities. Alarm
rate has to be presented at a rate that allows the operators to understand the purpose of
the alarm and to make a correct action.
9In an emergency situation the goal state of the plant changes significantly, and the alarm
system should be able to adapt to this change. Alarm system should be usable even in
the major process disturbances.
As the alarm systems and process control systems are developed the operators should
receive training for the basics of the system. Training has to be designed for the needs
of operators. Without proper training there is a risk that the alarm systems may be un-
clear and cause confusion to operators. NPD has concluded a table for maximum alarm
rates in disturbance situations in oil refineries, see Table 1.
Table 1: Alarm rates in major disturbances (NDP, 2011)
The alarm system should be provided with various utility programs, a performance mon-
itoring system for an example. This system should include tools and methods for meas-
uring performance indicators in an alarm system. Information from performance monitor-
ing system is used for continuous improvement of the alarm system. Continuous im-
provement should lead to improvements with low interval so that the operators are able
to adapt to updates. Process simulator, if available, should be used for tuning the perfor-
mance of the alarm system.
A fault tolerant alarm system ensures that the critical information is always available to
the operators, both in normal operation and in an emergency situation. Alarm system
should be redundant as well as DCS and all the critical I/O cards, bus systems and CPUs.
UPS should be provided for the critical parts of the process, alarm system and process
control system for an example.
Alarm systems response time should not exceed over 2 seconds. For presentation in
main alarm lists, a time stamping resolution of 1 second will be sufficient. In the alarm
Alarm rate in major disturbance: Consequence:
>10 alarms per minute Excessive and very likely to lead the op-
erator abandoning the use of the system
2-10 per minute Hard to cope with
<1 per minute Should be manageable, but may be diffi-
cult if several alarms require a complex
operator response
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log and for use by the suppression logics, 100 millisecond time stamping or better is
required. Sometimes it is important to see which caused the disturbance in the unit;
hence faster time stamping gives better understanding of start of the problem (NDP,
2011).
Neste has considered pop-up alarm screens for critical alarms, but have chosen not to
use them, but instead to decrease the amount of alarms to make it easier to react for the
control room operators. V. Kuuluvainen stated that Neste has discussed about alarm
sound inhibition timers. The operators could inhibit the alarm sound with a special timer
button, which would mute the sound for specific amount of time. Neste chose not to use
the system. However, Neste chose a goal to decrease the amount of alarms in disturb-
ance situations as well as in normal operation (Kuuluvainen, 2015).
4.3 Alarm suppression
The objective of alarm suppression is to ensure that the alarms are relevant to the oper-
ator's work under the current process conditions and to avoid alarm flooding during pro-
cess disturbances. Alarm information presented should be important and cause action
from the operator. In disturbance situation alarm flooding is always risking the plant and
drifting the plant towards interlock state (NPD, 2011).
Control room operators should be familiar with the alarm suppression system, see Figure
4. System should be well documented in understandable way and the system description
should be easily found. On a redundant measurements there should be suppression for
the measurements in unusual process conditions to reduce amount of alarms from the
measurements. For an example, there should be one alarm of equipment shutdown to
control room, and all other alarms should be suppressed that are consequences of the
equipment shutdown. For an example the suppression activates when the recycle com-
pressor stops and prevents alarm flood from oil pressures, vibrations and low compres-
sor load to operator. This is very useful and has high impact on the task load of the
operator.
Alarm suppression should be used prior to alarm filtering. As said the suppression is
preventing too many alarms from triggering, but the alarms will be shown on detail pages
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for further investigation. If the alarms are filtered the details are lost which is not recom-
mended (NDP, 2011).
Figure 4. Alarm processing and handling concepts (NDP, 2011)
4.4 Alarm prioritization
Prioritization of alarms is critical for safe control of the process units. Prioritization is used
to help the operator to decide which alarm require immediate action and which alarm
may wait.  All the alarms should be prioritized to different categories. It is not recom-
mended to use more than 4 categories (NDP, 2011).
Commercial airline companies have commonly 4 alarm categories as well.  A maximum
of three priorities should be used within any one type of display for normal display of
alarms. An additional fourth priority level for safety-critical alarms could be used, but
these are presented very rarely. The fourth category may also be used to inform ON-
state of the equipment once started.
It is important to be consistent with the alarm priority definitions throughout the whole
refinery. Changing the priority categories for specific alarms should be done by author-
ized automation personnel only.
Priorities should be categorized according the severity of the consequences if the oper-
ator does not make an action after the alarm has been triggered. When the alarm sup-
pression works properly and the alarms are categorized properly the operator may find
the important information quickly from the alarm screen.
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There should be relatively small amount of high priority alarms that direct the operator’s
attention towards the most important alarms, see table 1 (NDP, 2011).
It is recommended to assign alarm priorities based on the target occurrence rate for each
priority. In addition, and the most importantly the priorities should be assigned according
the vitality of the alarm for the safe and stable plant operation. This priority categorization
happens usually naturally for the reason that the vital components for the process are
usually chosen and designed to be most reliable parts of the process and the alarm
occurrence rate is very low. It is recommended to use three main priority categories. The
fourth category may be put aside because the occurrence rate of these alarms should
be extremely low or used only as an ON-state alarm. It is recommended that 80% of the
alarms should be in the third priority category, 15% should be in the second highest
priority, 5% in the first priority category and if the fourth category is being used it should
include only few extremely high priority alarms that occur very rarely (NDP, 2011).
4.5 Metso DNA visual alarm prioritization categories
Metso DNA is a new generation DCS and it is widely used in Neste, see Figure 1. Alarms
are categorized in 4 categories. 3 out of 4 are main alarm categories and the fourth
category is used for deactivated alarms.
Metso’s categorization system has many improvements compared to few years older
systems as Honeywell Alcont TPA. High end suppression system for an example. Alarm
suppression is strongly used in Metso’s DCS which is a huge improvement to older sys-
tems like Honeywell Alcont TPA.
Visual prioritization categories are designed to help the operator to find the most im-
portant information from the alarm scree. However, the triangles are rather small and
critical category includes very important alarms which may not be forgotten in case of an
emergency. The author claims that the alarm suppression has higher impact on the task
load of the operator during a process disturbance than the visual prioritization. Practice
has shown that the alarm suppression is very effective for lowering the operator’s task
load.
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Figure 5. Alarm priorities in Metso DNA in Porvoo (Neste Oyj, 2013)
Figure 6. Alarm page in Metso DNA in Porvoo (Neste Oyj, 2015)
4.6 Siemens TXP visual alarm prioritization categories
During the nuclear plant visits the author noticed that the TVO’s plant was using Siemens
TXP DCS for turbine side of the plant (Fortum’s representative had PMS for alarm
screening and history trending, the rest was analog displays and knobs). Alarm prioriti-
zation in TXP was similar to Metso DNA and Honeywell Alcont. There were 3 main cat-
egories: Alarm (red A) which was highest in the prioritization category, Warning (yellow
W) which was the second in the prioritization category, Fault (F) which was lowest in the
main category. It seems that this category system is common in all systems.
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4.7 Alarm system development in Porvoo refinery
Present time alarm system, especially Metso DNA, is using automatic masking (or sup-
pression) for alarms. The scope is to reduce the operator’s alarm load in unusual process
conditions. In addition, some of the alarms are becoming meaningless after equipment
has stopped by the operator (Neste Jacobs, 2013).
CR1251 is applied to the projects that are executed by the Neste Jacobs. Alarm system
includes “Process alarm” and “Operator alarm”. Process alarm has fixed limit that is de-
fined during the design phase. This limit can be changed by authorized personnel only.
Operator alarm can be set by an operator and it does not have fixed limits. The alarms
that are set by the operators are always lowest priority alarms. The importance of the
alarm is determined by the process designer. Neste has acknowledged that the alarm
current to operator is considered too high in unusual process conditions (Neste Jacobs,
2013).
On the other hand in HAZOP new alarms are being added to the system. Usually these
alarms are in high category and they cannot be suppressed automatically.
Decreasing the operator’s alarm load during a process disturbance means a review of
the process protections at the end of the basic design phase or at the early stage of
execution phase. The review is done to eliminate alarms that become unnecessary after
a process protection function, even if they are in the first priority category. This is part of
prioritization logic of the alarms.
Alarm masking system has to be reviewed carefully and usually the review meeting in-
cludes experts from many departments: process design engineer(s), automation design
engineer(s), plant operation engineer(s), experienced operator(s) and others that are
considered to be needed for the review.
Unit’s most recent PI diagram revision, Safety Integrity Level specification document,
cause and effects diagram,  HAZOP record and related list of actions should be handed
over for the participants of the review (Neste Jacobs, 2013).
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5 Emergency management in Porvoo refinery
5.1 General
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic knowledge of the expenses and
the reasons of emergencies, obligations of the personnel during the emergencies and
information channeling during the emergencies.
Note that there are many kind of factors that may lead the process to disturbance. Data
collected by the Hydrocarbon Publishing Company (HPC) in 2013 shows that there were
1200 refinery shutdowns in the US from 2009 to 2012 in total. 46% of the shutdowns
were due to mechanical failures, 19% were caused by electrical disturbances, 23% were
result of predetermined maintenance shutdowns and the least 12% were mostly due
leakages and process fires (Hydrocarbon Publishing Company, 2013).
Looking at the percentages in Figure 7, it is easy to notice that highest risk for the dis-
turbances are the mechanical equipment (mostly rotary equipment). Electrical disturb-
ances are including shutdowns due bad weather.
Figure 7. Reasons of shutdowns in the USA and the causes of power disturbances
(HPC, 2013)
Main causes to power disturbances are unspecified in their data (60.4%). The reason for
unspecific data may be that the refinery did not know the exact reason of the failure while
writing the report. Weather was the cause in 16.4% of the cases, breakdowns 17.6% and
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rest were fires (1.9%), surges (1.9%) and other (1.9%). Weather’s high percentage may
be explained by the strong storms in the US.
Usually the disturbances are local and not affecting the whole refinery or there are alter-
native feed sources and production locations in case of process disturbance in one pro-
cess unit.
This chapter is dedicated for the extremely rare and challenging disturbances that would
affect the whole oil refinery or in worst case to shut it down temporarily.
5.2 Announcements and obligations
There are many type of emergencies in oil refineries: process disturbances, process
fires, emissions to environment, nuisance or harm to environment and to neighbors, haz-
ards to personnel working in the area and accidents which may lead to injuries or even
worse: death.
Neste Porvoo uses information channels depending of the quality, the magnitude and
the severity of the emergency. The eye witness is always obligated to inform the product
manager of the line and/or control room operator immediately after the accident or other
abnormal situation.
If the emergency is not causing unusual noise, process fire, emission, excessive flaring
(over an hour), smell, accident, major process disturbance or other major deviation from
normal operation the emergency is informed to fire department’s “quiet phone number”
(if needed) which does not cause a voice alarm system to trigger in the fire department.
This kind of situation would be a minor wound to hand of a victim.
If the situation includes any of the previously mentioned items the emergency call out to
fire department shall be made immediately. In addition, the refinery’s shift supervisor
shall be informed by the production manager of the line, if necessary.
Shift supervisor makes actions depending of the emergency. If the emergency happens
during normal office hours and includes unusual noise, process fire, emission, excessive
flaring (over an hour), smell or a process disturbance the shift supervisor calls to head
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of supervision and to head of operation department. Head of supervision or head of op-
eration department takes contact to communication manager who makes a deviation
report in Crisis Commander (software), to info-phone and to company’s deviation
webpage. If the emergency includes environmental point of view the environmental man-
ager is included to the process. The info-phone and the webpage are designed to notify
neighbor companies and residents about the deviations. In addition, a NCR-report is
saved to a system.
If the emergency happens outside of the normal office hours and includes unusual noise,
emission, process fire, excessive flaring (over an hour), smell or a process disturbance
the shift supervisor makes a deviation report in Crisis Commander by himself. Shift su-
pervisor should never make estimates of production losses in the report. Shift supervisor
always decides if he should call to head of supervision or any other manager outside of
the normal office hours. In addition, a NCR-report is saved to a system.
In case of a major emergency (severe injuries, death, major fire, major emissions etc.)
an emergency preparedness group is been set up. For major emergencies there is an
emergency preparedness group: situation director, supervisor of the operations depart-
ment, a person who is in charge of communication, a person in charge of maintenance,
a person from HSSE (personnel safety, work permitting, waste management etc.), cor-
responding person of the situation information (two persons) and the chief of fire depart-
ment. In addition, a NCR-report is saved to a system (Neste Oyj, 2015).
The production manager of the line orders the control room operator to turn and lock the
surveillance camera to a point at the scene of the incident if possible. Footage from all
the cameras is recorded on a digital recorder for later retrieval for investigation purposes
(Neste Oyj, 2015).
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6 Controlling the Porvoo refinery in a major disturbances
6.1 General
Chapter 6 describes the precautions done by Neste against major process disturbances
in a whole Neste’s Porvoo refinery area. The author’s target is to find the preparedness
level of Porvoo refinery against major process disturbances and/or emergencies. Second
target is to find possible vulnerabilities and to find a solution and/or recommendations for
further investigations.
6.1.1 Steam disturbance
Usually the situation management for steam shortages comes from Porvoo’s power
plant. This kind of situation may occur when one or more boilers in the power plant shuts
down. If the outage is major the shift supervisor starts to manage the steam usage and
production in the refinery according the OQD-1547.
In steam shortage the power plant maximizes the production, channel burners are
started at KTVL2&3 and opens both transfer lines to production. Production has 4 stage
plan against steam shortages.
In the first stage the production of steam boilers are maximized in the production, steam
to refinery’s edge areas is minimized (see OQD-1547 attachment 1), RVTO3 decreases
steam intake, SYRP and KARP2 reduces stripping steam, ADIP circulation is  decreased
in RVTO1&2, RT3 minimizes steam to preheater EA-10168 and TAME-unit is set to re-
cycle. Total estimated saving is 135 t/h of 16bar steam and 46 t/h of 5 bar steam.
In the second stage the KTO5 unit is shutdown, production line 4 switches steam turbine
pumps to electrical pumps, FCC decreases steam to BEJT and ALKY minimizes the
steam at DA-9801. Total estimated saving is 12 t/h of 5 bar steam, 54 t/h of 40 bar steam
and 16 t/h of 16 bar steam.
In the third stage the HEY unit is shutdown, MTBE unit is shutdown, KARP2 is set to
recycle, steam usage of HVY4&5 is minimized and stripping steam of TT2 and BIY is
minimized. Total estimated saving is 75 t/h of 5 bar steam.
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In the fourth stage the RET unit is shut down.
It is very important to maintain at least 14 bar of pressure in the 16 bar steam system. It
is important to reduce usage of 16 bar steam which helps the power plant to maintain
high pressure on 100 bar system. If the 100 bar system is also loosing pressure the
recycle compressors in REF3 has to be shut down which means high production losses
(Neste Oyj, 2010).
6.1.2 Power disturbance
Depending of scale and magnitude of the power failure, the electrical duty officer is nor-
mally prioritizing the tasks inside the refinery.
Every substation is equipped with an alarm system. All the common alarms are con-
nected to the remote operating systems. In addition, the substations alarm systems are
connected to a main power plant’s control room. Control room operator is consulting the
shift electrician about the alarms.
The refinery’s electric network has been protected with relays. When one part of the
network is disturbed the relays are automatically protecting the healthy network. The
relay system is designed to remove as less as possible of equipment from the network
no matter where the disturbance happens (Neste Oyj, 2012).
Porvoo refinery has been equipped with back-up generator system. This system gives
power to vital parts of the process when the main power has been lost. It is good to
understand that full blackout in Kilpilahti-area is happening very unlikely because the
refinery is using the national power grid.
Some parts of the process are equipped with backup power (UPS and diesel generators):
the process control systems are equipped with UPS and the UPS are getting power from
diesel generators once started. The generators are feeding power to only some prede-
termined process equipment that are vital for safe shutdown of the refinery.
The diesel generators are starting automatically when the power is lost in the substation
(all transformers). Note that the generator tries to start three times automatically in 30
seconds. If the generator fails to start automatically it has to be started manually by the
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electrician. The generators are used only when the substations is in complete blackout.
There are backup transformers for each substation and even if the substation is not
equipped with the backup transformer, there are two transformers feeding two separate
rails and one transformer can handle two rails.
In local power disturbances (transformer feed cable failure for an example) the system
is switching the back-up transformer on automatically (or connecting the healthy trans-
former to both rails). Feed transfer produces short, few second long blackout. Those
equipment that are equipped with automatic restart system shall start automatically in
time sequence (to reduce the load of the transformer). There are usually 3 to 4 se-
quences in 30 seconds.
Diesel generators are started only when there is total blackout in the substations (all
transformers are lost). The diesel generators are feeding all the equipment mentioned in
the attachment and in addition: the emergency lightning, UPS rechargers, fire alarm sys-
tems, fire water system and many other vital systems that need to work in any condition
(Järvinen, 2015).
Power failures are usually local, but they are occurring more often than one could pre-
sume. From 2009 to 2012 there were 323 refinery or partly shutdowns in the US (Hydro-
carbon Publishing Company, 2013).
6.1.3 Hydrogen disturbance
In case of hydrogen shortage in the refinery, some of the process units have to be set to
lower feed rater, to recycle or even to complete shutdown. In the night time the shift
supervisor is giving orders that which units have to lower their feed rates and how much.
In the daytime the production planners are giving orders to shift supervisor which is giving
orders to control room and field operators as well as production managers of the line.
 Porvoo refinery’s hydrogen network is complex and the proper actions have to be dis-
cussed with production planners (daytime). Usually if there is shortage of hydrogen the
hydrogen units 1 and/or 2 are maximizing their feed rates and try to compensate the loss
of hydrogen in the refinery’s hydrogen network. Especially when losing the reformatting
unit 3’s side product hydrogen it is hard for the old compressors to withstand the high
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hydrogen content in the gas. Detailed description may be found from OQD-2257 (Neste
Oyj, 2015).
6.1.4 Instrument air disturbance
If the instrument air pressure is dropping abnormally there are steps to avoid further
problems. All the steps are explained in OQD-1553. It is possible to start extra air com-
pressors and if that is not possible, there are valves that connect production lines air
systems together. If the pressure is still sinking it is possible to get extra air from the main
power plant.
If all the actions have been made and the air pressure is lost due a big leakage for an
example, all the unit operators are starting to shut down the units while following the
procedures (most of the units are already down because of the S.I.S). After the emer-
gency shutdown it is important to monitor for leakages and to minimize losses (process
equipment, health and environment).
Starting up the refinery after a major instrument air failure takes time and the utility sys-
tems have to be started prior to process units. Specific unit start-up order has been made
and it may be found from OQD-1553 (Neste Oyj, 2015). Note that this order may differ
from the procedure OQD-1553 depending of the severity of after effects of emergency
shutdowns.
6.1.5 Natural gas feed disturbance
Natural gas (NG) feed is very important for the refinery. NG (=methane) is used to keep
the furnaces, turbines and boilers running and the refinery’s hydrogen plants are relying
on the NG feed for the reformation process.
There are 5 stages of measures to be taken against NG shortage. In stage one all the
minor effecting actions are done which reduces NG intake approximately 30 tons/h. In
stage 2 gas turbine power plant 3 is stopped and the feed is changed from NG to fuel oil
which reduces NG intake approximately 15 tons/h. In stage 3 the hydrogen plant 2 is
stopped and the feed gas is changed to propane which reduces NG intake approximately
22
33 tons/h. In stage 4 which is total NG outage all the rest of the locations that are normally
using NG are replaced by fuel gas, propane and/or fuel oil (Neste Oyj, 2015).
If the NG shortage would turn to full cut off it is possible to run Porvoo refinery (to some
extinction) with propane, but it has never been tested with the current unit setup. It is
possible that not all the process units could be in production if the NG intake would have
to be fully cut off. There are plans and procedures made for this situation (Shift supervi-
sor, 2015).
6.1.6 Cooling water disturbance (production lines 1/2/4)
Production line 3 is left out from the research because production line 3 is using separate
cooling water system.
If the disturbance is considered as minor (one pump stops and cannot be started for an
example) the spare pump is being started. If there is no spare pump available the CW
return temperature has to be monitored carefully. If the temperature is not manageable
the biggest cooling water users have to be adjusted as needed. KTY in production line 1
is a massive CW user (feed rate of the unit has to be lowered/other process changes
made etc.). Depending of the scale of disturbance the other units have to be shut-
down/put on recycle.
If the whole cooling water system stops for a short moment it is important to maintain
good start-up conditions in CW-system. In this case the process units have to set to
recycle or shutdown as long as the CW is unavailable.
If the whole cooling water system stops for a longer period in the winter time, all possible
actions to prevent freezing has to be made in addition to stopping the units (Neste Oyj,
2012).
6.1.7 Flare system disturbance
If the process control PCs in the control room are compromised, the controllers are main-
taining the current position. TOP-system may be used to monitor state of the process.
However, if the disturbance is caused by the bus failure, the TOP-system is unavailable
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as well. In this case the process has to be monitored at the field (especially the state of
the compressors and the liquid levels of the flare drums).
If the problem occurs in the process stations all the valves are set to failsafe state (fail-
safe states are presented in OQD-1099).
When the process control has been lost completely the field operators must check that
the compressors are stopped, to maintain pilots on at the flares tips and the flare drum
levels must be visible.
In case of a total power failure the aim is to maintain pilots on at the flare tips and flare
drum levels must be kept visible. Some of the flare drum pumps are connected to diesel
generators, exception to this are the well pumps (whole list presented in OQD-1099). If
the process control is still on (connected to UPS) the control room operator has to check
that the pumps has been started and the drum levels are in control (Neste Oyj, 2003).
6.1.8 Sulphur recovery unit disturbance
Finnish “Environmental Permit” requires that the sulphur recovery rate and the utilization
rate of the sulphur recovery units have to reach certain degree. The sulphur emissions
has to be decreased to lowest possible level.
Usual reasons for sulphur recovery unit (RTO) disturbances are: sour gas feed quality
fluctuations, hydrocarbons in the feed, cutbacks in utilities and equipment failures.
Oil refinery is obligated to inform the ELY-keskus (Centre for Economic Development,
Transport and the Environment) in case of a disturbance in the sulphur recovery unit(s).
Refinery’s shift supervisor is obligated to inform the environmental manager about the
disturbance. Environmental manager makes a notification in the Crisis Commander and
a NCR notification (Neste internal system). Environmental manager makes an additional
notification to Porvoo’s city hall and the ELY-keskus. Environmental manager updates
info-phone (or the shift supervisor in the night shift) and website for the neighbors in
addition. These information channels are used to keep neighbor companies and inhab-
itants aware of the disturbances.
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Disturbance notification is made if: sour gases from one sulphur recovery unit are sent
to flare for an hour or more and the instant shut-off valve XCV-7351 is in closed position,
sour gases from two or more Sulphur recovery units are sent to flare and instant shut-off
valve XCV-7351 is in closed position. If the XCV-7351 is in open position, the flare gases
are fed to flare gas recovery unit and then compressed to fuel gas (through the hydrogen
sulfide absorber).
If one of the sulphur recovery unit is disturbed the sour gases are fed to other sulphur
recovery units. If the gas flow is too high to these units, the Superclaus-reactors may be
bypassed. If there is flow of sulphur to flare system, instant actions has to be done. The
load of the sulphur recovery units have to be lowered. The load is lowered by means of:
lowering the feed rate of the HVY5, HVY5 to complete recycle, lowering the feed rate of
the HVY4, HVY4 to complete recycle, KARP3 to minimum feed (feed from tank U-1 max-
imized) or to complete recycle, SYRP to minimum feed rate or to complete recycle,  MHC
feed to lower sulphur content, VK to minimum feed rate, NExBTL1&2 to minimum feed
rate and by setting the lower sulphur content crude oil tank (cavern type) to recycle.
OQD-6802 describes the information channels in detail.
7 Fire fighting in Porvoo refinery
7.1 General notes
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic knowledge of fire fighting tactics
in Porvoo refinery as well as to describe the responsibilities of the personnel.
The actions against process fire are always dependent of scale, location and material of
combustion. There are vast amount different sorts of hydrocarbons, gases, chemicals
and other combustible material around the oil refinery which brings special challenges
against process fires.
7.2 Production department’s responsibilities and tactics against industrial fires
The main responsibilities of production department are: to rescue those in immediate
danger and to give first aid, to alert fire-brigade, to start first line fire-extinguishing and to
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start those operative actions that are required to stop the fire. Those operative actions
are: to inform others and evacuate persons that are not required to stay near the location
of fire, to shut down the flow of flammable liquid/gas to location of fire, to emergency
shutdown the process unit(s) if required (may cause further problems, normal shutdown
or recycle state if possible), to release the pressure from the unit if considered necessary,
to monitor unit’s state continually to notice possible changes in the process equipment
(cracks, increasing pressure and so forth), to monitor nearby units (shutdown if neces-
sary) and to maintain normal operation on the units that are not affected by the fire (Neste
Oyj, 2015).
7.3 Fire department’s responsibilities and tactics against industrial fires
The main goals for the fire department are: to figure out the best and safest driving route
to destination, to be located on the safe side of the wind, to inform security guards of
area of isolation, to give call out of danger by public address system, to ensure that no
one is injured and to ensure that no one is threatened by the fire, to examine that what
kind of material is leaking, pressure of the system, temperature of the system (with from
production department), to examine if it is possible that the fire may spread to surround-
ings and to inspect if the other process equipment or structures are compromised, to
extinguish the fire quickly (exception to gas leakages, look below), to start cooling down
the surrounding equipment and structures with water spray and to inform waste water
treatment plant if the foam is being used (Neste Oyj, 2015).
7.4 Extinguishing industrial fires
7.4.1 Flammable gases
If the gas has been leaking for a certain period of time, it may have been gathered as a
cloud and when the cloud of gas ignites it will give short “swoosh” sound. The flame front
shall proceed from the edges of the cloud through the cloud with speed less than 20 m/s.
Radius of hemispherical shaped gas cloud doubles after ignition and after the material
has burned to the end the flame proceeds as a pointed flame from the leak source.
Pointed flame may ignite immediately or after the swoosh effect. The pointed flame may
burn at up to 1300 degrees of Celsius (when hydrocarbons).
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Reaction speed at gas cloud explosions might exceed the speed of sound and the pres-
sure wave may cause severe damage. The space where the explosions takes place has
significant impact on the severity of the pressure wave. If the space is confined the dam-
ages are significantly larger.
BLEVE is an explosion caused by the rupture of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid
above its boiling point.
If the gas leakage takes place, but does not ignite there is a significant risk of explosion.
If the leakage is considered as large, always evacuate the area. Considering the leaking
material it may be recommended to spread the gas cloud with water spray or by using a
water wall to prevent the cloud to proceed next to an ignition source (for an example a
furnace) (Neste Oyj, 2015).
Generally there are three different options to extinguish a gas fire:
Confining the leakage if possible. Closing valves that will shut off the gas flow to location
of the leakage. If the valve is not remotely operable and the valve is located in or near
the gas cloud, water spray may be used to confine the gas outside of the valve. Note
that the person (if not a fire fighter) who operates the valve should use proper clothing
and equipment while operating the valve.
Controlling the flame until the flammable gas flow eventually stops. This manner requires
that the nearby structures and equipment are cooled down and the flame is controllable
inside the water spray(s).
Extinguishing the flame and closing the source of the leakage. This manner is last option
and shall be used only when the flame causes a bigger risk than the gas cloud itself.
When using this technique all the preparations against reignition shall be done.
Cooling down the vessel has few basic key points: use fixed water sprays, 10 liters of
water per minute per square meter (pointed flame 2000 liters of water per minute) or 100
liters per minute per vessels height meter, spray uniform film of water to the surface of
the vessel and make sure there is constant water spray on the vessel (Neste Oyj, 2015).
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7.4.2 Flammable liquids
Liquids that have boiling point of 35 degrees of Celsius or lower and flash point of 0
degrees of Celsius are considered as an extremely flammable liquid. Liquids that have
flash point of 21 degrees of Celsius or lower are considered as a highly flammable liq-
uids. Liquids that have flash point over 21 degrees of Celsius but lower than 55 degrees
of Celsius are considered as a flammable liquid.
In oil refineries the liquids are processed in different kind of pressures and temperatures.
Temperature of the substance has an effect on flammability, gasification and on the
swoosh effect if the gas cloud is ignited. In the process area the liquid may be in high
pressure or the flame may heat up a vessel where the liquid is over its boiling point.
These factors have to be considered at all times.
Liquid fires are extinguished with a water spray or with a foam depending of the situation.
Structures may be cooled down with a direct water spray or with a water mist. If direct
water spray is used it is recommended to collide the spray to object nearby. Colliding the
water to an object makes a nozzle effect and the spray is spread in larger area and the
cooling is more uniform.
For red-hot metal objects it is recommended to start with a water mist and the mist should
cover most of the surface at once. Start with low amount of water and increase the flow
in function of time. It is also possible to use rain-technique where the water is sprayed a
top of the object and it rains over the object. This technique is particularly recommended
for extremely hot objects (furnaces and heat exchangers for an example). Rain-tech-
nique prevents too fast temperature shifts which may cause even more severe leakages.
If the leakage is bursting out with pressure the foam is not recommended to be used.
The pressure shall push the foam away from the fire. However, the foam may be used
for underlying spaces. Water spray and powder is recommended for high pressure leak-
ages.
If the fire is shower (or fountain)-type it is recommended to consider if it is better to let it
burn and to control the flames instead. Extinguishing happens through production de-
partment (depressurization and draining the equipment). If the flame continues burning
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more than 5-20 minutes (depending of the situation and location) and there is no con-
sistent water spray, it is recommended to evacuate the area and shutdown the unit(s)
from the control room.
In case of a fire on the ground floor it is recommended to use foam even if the sewer
system works well. If the sewer system cannot withstand the amount of leaking product
or plugs the foam layer will prevent the flammable liquid from flowing to other process
units.
Note that it is fire department’s responsibility to prevent after effects of a fire and the fire-
department shall monitor the location for the required period of time (Neste Oyj, 2015).
8 The design of emergency procedures
8.1 General
The purpose of this chapter is to start a scientific research of emergency procedure de-
velopment in oil refineries and to find the path for better procedure development. This
research tries to combine technical information, theory behind previous procedure de-
signs, to combine knowledge from nuclear power, oil industry and airline industry as well
as to find a path for better emergency procedure designs, especially for oil industry.
As discussed in the previous chapters the operation manuals (emergency procedures
are usually part of it) are usually heavy to read and are not practical to be used during
the process disturbances. Checklists or other practical documentation should always be
provided to operators when the process unit is complex, the unit may cause severe dam-
age to other units, hazards to personnel, hazards to environment and/or economical risks
to the company. Usually every process unit is at least in one of these group.
Note that the checklist and other documentation should never go past the operator’s
and/or his supervisor’s judgement and the documentation should always be considered
as a tool, not as a book of orders. Sometimes it is more important to control the process
than to read the checklist. In some situations the operator may find way to maintain the
unit in production instead of shutting down the unit. This is wise also in safety point of
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view (may cause less temperature shifts and equipment shut downs in the unit). How-
ever, if the operator feels uncomfortable the checklist or other documentation may calm
the person down and point the goal state of the unit.
8.2 Fundamentals of the checklist development
It is highly recommended to have checklists or other practical documentation for unusual
process conditions in the oil refineries. Usually all the process units are set to recycle if
there is a minor process disturbance. In a recycle state the unit’s product(s) is (usually)
fed back to the feed drum. Recycle state is usually one of the safest states for the unit in
an unusual process condition. It is very important that the operators are familiar of setting
the unit to recycle safely and maintaining the unit on recycle for certain amount of time.
Note that the safe state may be something else as well.
In some major unit disturbances the aim is to release pressure and flammable material
from the unit as quickly as possible, but in a safe manner. These situations are usually
called as emergency situations because there is a high threshold to start these actions.
In these cases the recycle state is usually not the target state and the operators should
be trained and guided by the procedures to know how to act correctly in specific situation.
There are usually high amount of process equipment in the process unit and it is not
possible (or even convenient) to make emergency procedures to cover all the possible
equipment failures. Usually the first impact of the equipment failure targets to one part of
the process and this knowledge should be used in favor when developing the emergency
procedures and checklists. Note that the previous comment is always depending on the
emergency procedure design and cultural habit.
The emergency procedures and checklists should cover all the main parts of the process
and their disturbances (loss of cooling water, loss of power, loss of recycle compressor
for an example). It should be mandatory to provide sufficient emergency procedures to
operators as well as checklists against predetermined process disturbances.
Immediate shutdowns (emergency depressurization for an example) are usually causing
equipment failures for the reason that the equipment are getting shocks from fast tem-
perature shifts. The most common failures for this kind of shutdowns are heat exchanger
leakages which might emerge to severe process fires.
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The checklists could lessen the stress of the operators and to help them know that eve-
rything shall be fine when they follow the predetermined steps of the checklist.
8.3 Basic development principles
The function of the emergency checklists or block charts is to ensure that the operators
will operate the process units in a satisfactory level in case of a process disturbance.
These checklists are used rarely, thus it is very important that the operators are self-
studying the emergency procedures and checklists occasionally. It is very important for
the operators not to get into situation where they have never been. The meaning of the
previous sentence is that the operator should have already thought what happens when
different parts of the process are failing.
It should be mandatory to organize toolboxes and brainstorming sessions within the
shifts to examine and discuss about the accidents and near misses inside and outside
of the company.
8.4 Procedure system in commercial airplanes
It is necessary to do distinction between emergency procedure and emergency checklist.
Let us take a glimpse to this subject through the aviation. In aviation you have Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH) and Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM). Quick Reference
Handbook contains extracts from Aeroplane Flight Manual. Quick Reference Handbook
is often used as an alternative name for Emergency and Abnormal Checklist (EAC). Ear-
lier mentioned Non-Normal Checklist (NNC) is part of QRH. To make the terms a little
bit more complicated the AFM is a synonym for Operational Manual (OM). The terms
can be quite challenging to a person who is not familiar with aviation, but the basic idea
is that you have one Operational Manual which includes all technical data of the aircraft
and the QRH includes extracts from the OM. So in theory the OM is used for studying or
when the QRH does not provide sufficient information to solve the problem. OM is not
practical to use in abnormal situation and for this given reason there is QRH. This system
has many advantages: the QRH may be used to set the aircraft in a safe state without
forgetting important steps. When the aircraft is in safe state there is time to obtain the
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OM and use it to solve the problem (if required). The QRH makes sure that the pilot does
not forget these important steps when there is lot of confusion, noise, fatigue or any other
distractions that might lead the pilot to forget steps or to do something that is not sup-
posed to do. These tips or learns could be applied to oil industry as well.
8.5 Procedure development notes by NASA
NASA mentions a specific risk of checklists which is easily occurring when the compa-
nies are trying to maintain discipline. In some cases the checklist becomes a dumping
site to resolve discipline problems or to show management that a specific problem is
solved. By solving problems this way the immediate problems may be resolved, but at
the same time the importance of the procedures and/or checklists by the operators is
reduced which might lead to even more severe problems in the future (NASA, 1990).
8.5.1 Lessons that could be applied in the oil refinery
The emergency checklist or other document should reveal the operator that what are the
main tasks to reach safe state of the unit. Note that the safe state might differ depending
on the situation. This procedure should be available and obtainable at all times in vicinity
of the operator (not in the unit folder or randomly lying on a desk). Procedures should
include all the vital items that are needed to be done before the unit is in safe state.
Usually this requires separate procedures for control room and for field operator. Proce-
dures should be designed that way that the operators with less work experience would
be able to use them if/when needed.
The emergency procedure and the checklist or block chart should be available next to
unit’s panel in the control room. Both of them should be easily noticeable and the key
points should be found quickly. All the predetermined major disturbances shall be men-
tioned in the folder separately. There should be assigned responsible person who main-
tains and updates these procedures and checklists.
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8.6 Emergency procedure development in Loviisa nuclear power plant
Figure 8 shows the basic principle of the procedure development system in Loviisa nu-
clear power plant (originally from Areva). Fortum Oyj started a procedure development
and update project in 2004 which is still working in the year 2015. There has been sig-
nificant changes in the procedure template. Fortum developed the new template with
Areva (French multinational group specialized in nuclear and renewable energy), IAEA,
STUK on some other partners like Westinghouse. Fortum chose to use block chart type
system for emergency procedures to decrease the amount of pages, to make clear path
system between procedures and to make parallel actions possible. The block chart tem-
plate is originally designed by Areva. Operational procedures are still usually as text-type
with tables and numbering. Fortum was able to reduce the amount of pages significantly
with block chart templates.
Figure 8. Procedure development system (Fortum Oyj, 2014)
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Original procedures were conservative step to step text-type procedures where shift
leader was giving orders to the operators. The manuals were really heavy and they were
not found practical in Loviisa which was one of the reasons that the project started. Some
of the tasks during emergencies or even in minor disturbances were happening in parallel
which is challenging to show in text-type procedures.
Fortum’s former text-type emergency procedures were quite close to OQD-system in
Porvoo refinery. There were some exceptions: the items to be done were placed in ta-
bles, numbered and the template was slightly more systematic.
Fortum introduced block chart type procedures to fire fightning procedures as well. For-
merly these procedures were also in text-type template which was hard to use in practice.
Block chart type procedure gave clear instructions to every department whose obligation
is to do what and when. With the new template system the responsibilities became
clearer, it was easier to see parallel actions during the drills, it was easier to lead the
situation and the system was clarifying the responsibilities and tasks against after effects.
Fortum was using identification procedures to identify specific risks. These procedures
were used to follow the correct procedures in specific process states. The procedures
were also guiding the operator (or shift leader) to change the procedure if specific points
are reached in the process (reactor pressure decreases significantly for example).
All the items in the new procedure design are predetermined and they have boundary
conditions (maximum temperature for an example). These conditions include and may
withstand certain amount of additional problems happening in the process. However, if
these boundaries are exceeded the block charts are telling the reader to change to higher
risk category. This category means that the situation has become more threatening and
bigger actions have to be done to prevent catastrophic failures.
There were many similarities that could be used in favor for designing the procedures for
oil industry (most of them are listed in the end of the research). It has to be mentioned
that the power plants process seems to be slightly slower (or it has been designed that
way) than many oil refinery’s units. The procedure system is really heavy and high in
detail. It could not be used directly in the oil refinery. However, there were many proper-
ties that could be used (high end block chart template design for an example).
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8.7 Typography
The object of this part is to bridge the gap between the basic knowledge of typography
and the personnel that are designing the checklists for oil industry.
There are many types of documents employed in the control room. There may be typo-
graphical deficiencies as well as outdated data that has not been removed.
There are vast amount of aspects when designing the checklists. The report focuses on
typographical factors such as typefaces, character height, use of lower- and upper-case
characters, line length, and spacing. Some graphical aspects such as layout, color cod-
ing, fonts and character contrast are also discussed.
There was little information in literature for typography in emergency checklists. There-
fore, the information in this research is based on field studies done by the author. Differ-
ent kind of templates are found in subchapter “Checklist template comparison”.
When specifying the graphical appearance of checklists the designer must be careful in
combining several non-optimal conditions. These combinations tend to reduce the over-
all efficiency of the checklist (NASA, 1992).
Author recommends using “List of Design Recommendations” from “On the typography
flight-deck documentation”, Asaf Degani, 1992 for designing checklists for oil refineries.
As stated by Mr. Degani it is not simple to produce checklists that all the possible readers
would perceive the information accurately. It is highly possible that it is impossible to
produce this kind of checklists. However, designers should get closer to perfection by
means of typography. These learnings may be used while designing the emergency
checklists for the oil refineries.
8.7.1 Readability
Text should be written such way that a single word, word-groups, abbreviations and sym-
bols could be easily recognized from the text. This means that the spacing of individual
characters, spacing of words, spacing of lines and the ratio between character area and
the background (NASA, 1992).
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8.7.2 Reading conditions
Reading conditions may change over a day and seasons. If the emergency checklist is
being used in the field, there might be very moist, rainy, windy or snowy which are making
reading very difficult. If the lights are dim in the control room during night time it affects
optimal reading conditions negatively (NASA, 1992). Do not use gray text over white
background for this reason. Always print on water-proof paper for field use. See figure 9
for letterforms.
Figure 9. Letterforms and names (Degani, 1992)
8.7.3 Fonts
Fonts refer to alphanumeric style used in printing. There are thousands of fonts available
for different uses. Aviation industry uses mainly two fonts for checklists: roman and sans-
serif. Roman is mainly used in newspapers, journals and books. Sans-serif is a modern
font that does not include the little strokes that project horizontally from the top or bottom
of a main stroke (NASA, 1992).
Mr. Degani states that several researches have reported that sans-serif fonts are more
legible than roman. He also states that the thought behind this is that the sans-serif let-
ters are simpler and clean (NASA, 1992).
Serifs may add uneven appearance to the strokes and shapes. However, they make
reading more fluent and help the eyes to follow to horizontal movement. For this given
reason it is important to use adequate spacing between the letters while using sans-serif
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instead of serif font. The designer has to be aware of this to prevent eyes from skipping
a line while reading the emergency checklist. Avoid using long strings of text set in italics
and use primarily one or two fonts for emphasis.
There are many different fonts in the sans-serif group. In checklists it is important to use
characters that are not similar to each other, O and C for an example. Most modern sans-
serif fonts are having too much similar fonts and should not be used for this given reason.
Sources of similarity between the characters of modern sans-serif fonts as follows: ap-
pearance of the letters “P” and “R”, the effect of mirror images between the upper and
lower part of the letters (“E”, “B”, “D”), the use of equal radius for different letters (“G”,
“O”, “C”).
8.7.4 Lower-case and upper-case characters
Several research are stating that the lower-case characters are more legible than up-
per-case characters (Hartley, 1981; Philips, 1979; Tinker, 1963). Poulton (1967) per-
formed an experiment to determine the difference in a reader’s attention between up-
per and lower-case in newspaper headings. He reported that the lower case headings
were located faster than upper case heading. Tinker (1963) tested lowercase and up-
per-case fonts for legibility and pleasantness. He reported that lower case was read
faster and ranked higher in pleasantness (NASA, 1992).
Lower-case characters are the most used in everyday life and this might be one of the
reason that the upper-case characters are harder to read. Another factor is that the
lower-case characters are spread further away from each other which helps eyes to
recognize them better (NASA, 1992, p.12).
A shape of a familiar word is stored in the memory. While reading text the brains are
matching the observed word and the remembered memory patterns. Therefore, when
the word patterns are easily recognized by the brain it is easier to match the observed
words to memory patterns; hence reading becomes faster, pleasing and more accurate
(NASA, 1992, p.13).
Research (Philips, 1979) has shown that the emphasis given to the first letter of a word
will improve the speed of search. This finding is legit for lower-case as well as upper-
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case words. Most of the flight-deck documentation and aviation checklists used today
are set in upper-case (NASA, 1992).
8.7.5  Horizontal and vertical spacing of the characters
Horizontal and vertical spacing affects the readability of the text especially when the font
height is small. The recommended vertical space between lines is 25-33 percent of the
overall size of the font (Tinker, 1963; Woodson, 1981). The horizontal space between
characters is recommended to be approximately 25 percent of the overall height and not
less than one stroke width (NASA, 1992, p.13). See figure 10 for optimal spacing.
Figure 10. Optimal vertical and horizontal spacing (NASA, 1990)
8.7.6 Color coding
Some airlines use color coding to make distinction to normal checklists, abnormal check-
lists and emergency checklists. Black print over white is used for normal checklists, black
over yellow is used for abnormal checklists and black over light red is used for the emer-
gency checklists. For better color contrast yellow over black and blue over white are
recommended choices (NASA, 1992, p.23).
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8.7.7 Cognitive limitations
Effects of cognitive task load are highly dependent on task duration. Usually the negative
effects of the task load are increasing over time, see figure 11.
Figure 11. Task load over time (Mark A. Neerincx, 2003)
Vigilance is a problematic factor for operators which may cause problems to concentrate.
Vigilance increases when there is low task load, but time occupied is long. Performance
decrease can already occur after 10 minutes when an operator has to monitor a process
continuously, but does not have to act. Vigilance may cause stress, but it may also cause
boredom which leads to lower stage of alertness. In high risk plants this is always a
safety risk (Levine et al., 1973; Parasuraman, 1986).
Humans are inclined to focus on one task and are unwilling to switch to another task
even when the second task has a higher priority. They are stuck to their choice to perform
a specific task (Boehne & Paese, 2000).
There is a possibility that checklists could decrease the effect of the vigilance and mini-
mize the effect of inclined focus. Step-to-step system guides the operator to follow the
“guided route” to a safe state of the plant. This should be acknowledged by the com-
pany’s management (Mark A. Neerincx, 2003).
Considering the previous chapters it is recommended to use checklists at least in the
high risk units to reduce task load and to minimize the effects of vigilance or overload.
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8.8 Checklist template comparison
Procedure template of Figure 12 follows chronological order. Procedure explains possi-
ble reasons for the disturbance and then lists the correct actions to be taken. In typogra-
phy point of view the text is written clearly, however, some of the procedures are provid-
ing high amount of information which may confuse the reader especially during the pro-
cess disturbance. Some of the letters are packing up which is not recommended.
Figure 12. Emergency procedure in OQD-system (Neste Oyj, 2010)
Weakness of this system is that the predetermined major disturbances are not presented
clearly in the unit folder. Disturbances are not clearly placed disturbance per page. In
addition, the text follows book-like order which is challenging to use in practice.
This system is useful for self-studying and it can explain actions and other information in
detail. For this reason it appears to be very effective system if it is regularly used for self-
studying and the emergency checklists are designed to work in same logical order with
this detailed description. The author considers the OQD-system to work the same for oil
industry as an Aeroplane Flight Manual for aviation. Note that the emergency procedures
should be kept up to date with the checklists. Font is Arial size 11 which is easy to read
and could be considered as one of the best options for this kind of procedure.
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Note that it is recommended to have separate folders for the operational manuals and
emergency procedures. In the OQD-system the emergency procedures are placed in the
unit folder which is not practical for the operators.
Checklist style of Figure 13 lists few main predetermined disturbances for the process
unit. Column on the most right corner lists the main disturbances. When the current dis-
turbance has been found the reader may follow the row to the right. On the top row are
the items to be taken in consideration in logical order (from left to right). On the row which
the current disturbance exists, are the actions to be taken.
Figure 13. Table-style emergency checklist for VHVI-unit (Neste Oyj, 2004)
Once the reader knows how to read the template it is quick to use and takes only few
seconds for the reader to determine the correct actions for the situation.
Downside of the system is the large size of it. If the process unit has high amount of
predetermined disturbances and high amount of actions to be taken the table may be-
come illegible. Another downside is that if the emergencies have high variety of the items
the aspect of the table changes considerably and the template is not consistent. The
reader have to be very careful for not jumping over the items and the template gives very
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general information to reader. Some notes are added to bottom of the template and nav-
igating through the template is very challenging. The template is too technical in practice.
In Figure 14 is a typical checklist of an airplane. The item to be checked or configured is
placed on the left column. Dot line connects the item to the action. Many items and ac-
tions are written in abbreviations. Checklists are read from top to bottom which is the
correct logical order for the current situation.
Figure 14. Typical checklist in aviation (NASA, 1990)
Downside of this system is the high amount of abbreviations. However, the risk of mis-
understandings may be lowered considerably by training. Also the dot line may guide the
reader to wrong action, especially when the line is long.
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The amount of the items does not change the appearance of the template considerably.
System may be used during the emergency situation as well as normal start-up or shut-
down situations.
This list type may not be used directly in oil refinery because there is not enough room
for the text. However, there are items that could be used for the checklist. These items
could be the dot line which could be used to reach uniform template which does not
change drastically if the sentences are different in length, which typically is the situation.
Another item is the stacking of items underneath each other. However, in the refinery
there are usually many actions happening along each other. This may lead to a risk that
the operator follows one step too cautiously and does not read the following step which
may be already in higher priority. The risk could be decreased by proper training, but not
removed completely. System to decrease this risk should be inspected.
Figure 15 presents high amount of information in one page. Checklist includes nearly as
much information as the OQD-template in Figure 12. The difference is that the template
lists only the items to be done. The template does not explain the possible causes for
the disturbance.
Figure 15. Unofficial checklist template of Neste oil (Neste Oyj, 2012)
43
Downside of this template is the enormous amount of text. It may take too long for the
control room operator to follow this checklist to be usable. The template is also incon-
sistent.
This kind of checklist could be used in normal start-up and shut-down situations. Opera-
tors should have enough time to read it during these process conditions and the amount
of information should be increased for these occasions (compared to disturbances).
Figure 16 represents a checklist with more visual aspect. It is drawn with block charts.
Orange color block is the start of the disturbance. Operator checks the folder for the
occurred problem and then starts to follow the correct checklist from the top to down.
Blue blocks are presenting possible causes and ways to fix the problem. Yellow diamond
shaped blocks are question blocks that are questioning the operator if the problem was
fixed. After yellow blocks the operator may answer to the question and follow the correct
path.
Downside of this system is the multiform aspect which may lead the operator to confu-
sion. More practical research is needed for this system to become standard template.
Block charts have huge benefit on steps that should happen in parallel. Any text-type
system lacks this prospect. When the items may be displayed in parallel it helps the
operator to concentrate on all the items happening at the same time. Text-type system
lacks this parallel feature and it may lead the vigilance to decrease towards other events
in the unit.
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Figure 16. Block chart type emergency checklist (Albemarle Catalyst Academy, 2010)
Figure 17 presents an official checklist design used in production line 4 in Porvoo refin-
ery. Control room operators in production line 4 recommended the checklist system to
be used in normal shutdowns and start-ups. They have found it useful.
Production line 4 is the newest production line in Porvoo refinery which is started in the
21st century. In typography point of view the system is using sans serif font Arial, size 12.
The vertical spacing between the lines is 2 which is considered large, however, the items
in the checklist are pleasurable to read. The items are placed in their own rows separated
with the bullet marks. Checklist is not providing very detailed information, it is only listing
the key points in the emergency. This system has proved benefits for the operators. This
system has excessive amount text and information that could possibly be reduced in
order to make the list even easier to read.
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Figure 17. Emergency checklist in production line 4, Porvoo (Neste Oyj, 2012)
Figure 18 presents an emergency checklist template that is planned to be used across
the whole Porvoo refinery. The idea has been to use application called OhjeNET to cre-
ate a system where the checklists could be uploaded to devices in the control room as
well as to hand held field devices that the field operators would be carrying in the future
(and to any other computer based devices). OhjeNET is a system that may be used to
create a physical checklists as well. This procedure template is not only a template, but
a whole procedure system designed for creating the checklist procedures (emergency,
planning, turnarounds and so forth). The system takes concern for creating the check-
lists, updating the checklists, evaluation of possible hazards, approving the checklist,
change requirements, commenting and many other aspects that are required to create
valid procedures.
46
OhjeNET template uses color coding to separate different segments in the checklist.
Each segment is colored with segment specific color. On the example emergency check-
list of hydrogen plant nr. 1 there are: equipment based procedures, complete interlock
which is referring to a steam reformer, methane feed disturbance, CO2 absorber and
regeneration disturbance, hydrogen leakage at the absorber, loss of power, loss of in-
strument air, simple flow charts of the unit and notes how to update the procedures.
Each segment is generally divided to: consequences and actions to be done. The actions
to be done may change during the disturbance state of the unit. This has been solved by
adding additional titles that are describing the current state of the unit.
Example checklist is designed to be used at the field as well as in the control room.
Physical size of this checklist is very small which may bring some challenges in the con-
trol room (due dim lightning). The list is rather long and heavy because the same list is
designed to be used at the field and in the control room. The font is sans serif, but the
letters are leaning on the left and have some curvature in them. The empty space be-
tween the lines is not close to recommended 25-33% of overall size of the font but close
to 80%. The appearance is quite uniform, but there is still risk that some of the lines are
getting more emphasis. The small size and the neutral color of the first page is not opti-
mal for the control room. In addition, there is no designated space for the checklist in the
control room. Company’s target is to get OhjeNET to field devices and no physical check-
lists would be necessary. There has been prototypes of RFID equipped physical check-
lists. The checklist could be checked to see if the checklist is up to date.
Equipment based procedures may become handy at one point. However, it could be
recommended to separate these from the emergency checklist on actual oil units. The
checklist system is also missing table of contents and navigation system. The color cod-
ing is not as handy as QRH’s navigation flaps on the right side of the checklist. The
checklist is not referring to OQD at any point. OQD could be used after the unit has been
stabilized and refers to page numbers or titles could speed up the navigation between
these two checklists.
There should be completely different kind of checklist for control room operators. There
should be designated spot for the emergency procedures of each unit. The emergency
procedure (OQD) should be separated from the unit folder and placed next to the check-
list.
47
This checklist template has many advantages to many other systems: it may be uploaded
to computer based systems in the future, the dots are used to separate the items, color
coding has been initialized, the main tasks are placed on the list, most of the nice to
know information has been removed, is easy to carry at the field, is waterproof and it has
been considered that the state of the unit may change. The validation and commenting
cycle is being used.
This checklist template has some disadvantages that should be redesigned in the future:
the size of it is too small to control room, cover page is very neutral, there are unneces-
sary coloring in the text (titles for example), the first letter of each line is upper-case
character which is not necessary or give any bonus to text, vertical space between the
lines is too high, some critical items could be emphasized more (max. temperatures for
an example), font should be changed to less playful (the author was informed that this
has been changed already in the newer versions), some words that are constantly rep-
resented in the text could be used as abbreviations (temperature, pressure and so forth),
navigation flaps to right side of the checklist should be introduced, control room checklist
should be opened like a book not from bottom to top, the appearance should be more
uniform, some additional actions should be introduced and separated clearly from the
text to make the list as useful as possible and last the flowcharts could be removed from
the emergency checklist if the checklist could be understood without. The template does
not guide the designer to create consistent emergency procedures concerning the con-
tents of it.
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Figure 18. OhjetNET version for hydrogen unit nr. 1 (Neste Oyj, 2013)
9 New template design
As previously mentioned it has been proved that the humans have desire to concentrate
on one task at the time. In process industry this may lead to serious consequences. This
problematic human factor appeared often during the author’s plant visits in Olkiluoto and
Loviisa nuclear plants in Finland. This knowledge should be used in favor in oil industry
as well because we are fighting against the same problems and it is not possible to
change the human behavior in emergency situations. However, it is possible to contribute
the operators to make right decisions during process disturbances (process control sys-
tem, alarm system, procedures, by training, by help from other operators and by proper
supervision).
Detailed emergency procedures are good for self-studying, but they are not usable in an
emergency situation. After discussing with several shift operators the operators divided
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into two groups. One group stated that there is not enough time to use these procedures
in disturbances and some of them stated that there is already too much documentation
available. Another group stated that they have had good experience with these checklists
in non-normal operation (Production line 4 control room operators, 2015).
The first group’s operators also told that the disturbance situations are always different
and there is no one right way to solve the problem. However, some of the first group’s
operators saw the checklists usable for the younger process operators as well as for the
new process units. Operators that were working in the newer process units were clearly
more open minded and optimistic for these checklists.
Following the learnings from this research the author was able to design an emergency
checklist template for general process units in oil industry. Template follows Gill-Sans
MT font in Microsoft Word. The items are placed in time order. The author recommends
to use a specific location for the emergency checklists and that they are updated and
organized in a professional manner. The pages should be marked with small flaps with
corresponding failure and to color code each failure so it would be easy for the operator
to open the correct page.
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Figure 19. Recommended quick reference guide template
In Figure 19 is the recommended quick reference guide template. Every company should
be careful with the abbreviations and make sure that the personnel are trained in ad-
vance to minimize the risk of misunderstandings.
The font size should be designed for persons over 50 years old to make sure the font
size is sufficient.
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Figure 20. New template design
It is recommended to use separate pages for each disturbance. If the disturbance/equip-
ment failure takes place on more than one page notify the reader clearly that the same
failure continues on the next page.
Try to avoid too many abbreviations, too much bolding and colors. However, the designer
may and should presume that the reader has skills to control the unit and is experienced
enough to work without the checklist as well. Only add key points to checklists. Avoid
long sentences or technical data in the checklists.
This design may be used for book-style checklists as well as folder-type and flap-type
checklists. Flap-type is a checklist which is attached to one physical location. Each failure
is under a transparent plastic cover. Advantage is that the checklist will be located always
at the same location. Book-style checklist is mobile and may be used right next to the
keyboard which may be useful in a hectic situations. The best way would presumably be
to have both book- and flap-style emergency checklists.
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10 Conclusion
The Porvoo refinery’s preparedness against major disturbances is at a good level. There
are some minor procedures missing or outdated. Process control systems are in good
order, except for the alarm systems. Especially in Honeywell DCS systems there is alarm
flooding at an unacceptable level. The checklists are still a fairly new subject in the
Porvoo refinery, and it is something to improve in the future. Emergency procedures that
are affecting the whole refinery are spread around the OQD-system, they should be vis-
ible in one location in the company’s intranet.
It is likely that the attitude against checklists could change over time if proper lists would
be available. The author noticed that the operators were not familiar with aviation-type
checklists, and there was a clear distinction between experienced and younger opera-
tors. Experienced operators were more likely to be prejudiced and pessimistic towards
the checklists. However, the experienced operators were increasingly receiving when
they were told that these checklists are only to be used if found necessary and that the
use of these lists is not mandatory. It is also evident that the checklist has to be very well
written.
It is also good to mention that during writing this research, the author noticed that there
are wide range of documentaries and texts of previously happened process emergencies
available in English. Unfortunately, there is a lack of material available in Finnish. It could
be instructive to translate some document videos into Finnish.
Checklists should not be used to maintain discipline. Management may be tempted to
provide checklists that include all the possible information to maintain discipline and to
clear out responsibilities, but this is very hazardous to process safety. Too detailed
checklists are unpleasant to read, challenging to use and they are not serving their pur-
pose (to maintain control of process). All the personnel designing emergency checklists
should be aware of this.
There is a large number of unofficial templates and procedures available in Neste. The
number of procedures is increasing, but there is not enough consistency or any system
to tell people which procedures are up to date and which are not. Actions against this
should be taken immediately.
53
The hardest part of this research was to be neutral because the subject seems to be
very emotional. The author presumes that the recommended template will not be used
in practice but hopes that the future designers would try to use some of its features. In
Neste, the template could be used in OhjeNET-system in the future. In that case, the
OhjeNET-system should be improved further. Current Ohjenet-version is rather beta-
version than actual official procedure creation system. The software needs to be de-
signed further.
Based on this thesis the author recommends Neste to improve the quality of the docu-
mentation, especially the emergency procedures. Neste seems to have vast amount of
projects ongoing but it seems that the projects are cancelled one by one before the goal
is reached, and at the same time new projects are being started.
Based on the systematic approach to this subject, the author recommends Neste to cre-
ate a plan to bring the emergency procedures up to date. Current emergency procedure
system that includes many unofficial procedure templates on the side, is not optimal. The
company should have uniform line for creating these templates. In addition, company’s
brand should not play a role in emergency procedures (logos, colors or any other fea-
tures).
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Appendix 1. SIS logics in process units in Porvoo refinery
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Appendix 2. Recommended improvements to Neste
· Procedures generally are well stored and updated. This level should be kept.
· As seen on the Figure 12 some of the updated text in the OQD is in yellow. This
is Neste’s fashion to inform the reader that a new information has been initialized
to the procedure. This is not recommended fashion; hence the text becomes
challenging to read, especially if one in a hurry. This system should be developed.
· Some parts of the utility system does not have emergency procedures yet (nitro-
gen and coolant system in production line 1 for an example). These procedures
should be provided to operators.
· Emergency procedures considering the whole refinery should be placed to one
location. Currently the files are spread over the intranet and it is challenging to
find all the procedures.
· All the new process units should be equipped with emergency checklists (before
initial start-up).
· All the high risk units should be equipped with emergency checklists in some time
span.
· Alarm rates in major emergencies should be decreased to fractions from the cur-
rent situation, especially on Honeywells.
· Timer based alarm mute should be considered carefully. Currently the alarm
sound is continuous in unit disturbances which only causes stress to operators.
· Alarm pages could be redesigned in the future. It should be considered if the
super critical alarms would be presented on the bottom of the page or their block
size would be larger to emphasize their importance.
· Checklists should be made official documents and added to official OQD-system
that have to be updated periodically (attachments to OQDs).
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· Checklist should be considered as a tool, not as a dumping site to increase dis-
cipline.
· It would be instructive to have documentaries with Finnish subtitles of past pro-
cess disasters.
· Simple, practical toolboxes with your own team could be instructive once in a
while.
· Checklists for start-ups and shutdowns should be done for each unit. In TA2015
there were some kind of checklists, but they were spread around the procedures
which made them impractical to follow. It could be better to make these checklists
to block charts to make the parallel items available. Loviisa nuclear power plant
used this kind of system and it helped them to organize the right actions on right
time. Text-type lists are missing option to make some actions in parallel. Parallel
actions have to be performed before moving forward.
· Co-operation with other companies could improve the quality of the documenta-
tion crucially.
· Updating of the PIDs should be improved. It should be rethought if the plant en-
gineers would be allowed to make small changes to PIDs (add valve for an ex-
ample) to fasten the process. It is not justified to say that this could cause safety
hazards because the slow updating process is causing even higher hazards.
· There should be a risk assessment about uploading any information from the
OhjeNET application to any process control systems (if planned to do so).
· OhjeNET could be developed further to meet lessons of this research.
· Neste should not require brand colors and text types to emergency procedures.
This is hazardous to process safety!
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· If the hand held field computers are introduced they should be completely water
proof and the PMS should be available at the field. If the field operators could see
the PMS at the field, it could have unexpected benefits.
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Appendix 3. BESSI emergency checklist with new template design
